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PARTIES
J uan i ta J

FusseJ ] , Petiti oner

Department of Commerce Division of Occupational and
Professional Licensing, Respondent.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a response to Petitioners appea. i rom i :ir Order of
David E. Robinson, Director of the oivisit Profession:
dated May

:*

d

Licensing, Department of Commerce, State of Utah,
99 0-

The Petitioner seeks a reversal

and a remand with directions

;

-,

-'

- *

*i the Order
: .* *-.-.

a

her licensure as a doctoral level psychologist.
The Petitioner i n thi s matter, Juanita

Fussell (Fussell),

initially applied for' I. Icoiisuin at the doctors J. level as a
psychologist on August 5, ! 987,

Petitioner's application was

denied by the Psychologist Licensing Board on the basis that she
did not meei t .1 u=» reqi i I remei its of Utah Code A i n iota ted § 5 8-252(1)(b), wb

requires that:

1• Each applicant for a license to practice as a
psychologist shall:
(b) produce transcripts of credit which are acceptable to
the representative committee which demonstrate that the
candidate for licensing has received a doctoral degree based
on a program of studies whose content was primarily
psychological from an accredited educational institution,
recognized by the Division.

1

The Board's conclusion that Fussell did not qualify for
licensure in the State of Utah was upheld by the Special Appeals
Board.
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
The duties and functions of the Division of Occupational and
Professional Licensing are outlined in Utah Code Annotated § 581-1 et seq.

Section 58-1-6(1) (7) states that it is the function

and responsibility of the Division to prescribe, adopt and
enforce rules to administer Title 58 and also makes it the
responsibility of the Division to issue, refuse to issue, revoke,
suspend, renew, refuse to renew or otherwise act upon a license
or licensee.

Section 58-1-8 makes it the duty, function and

responsibility of the Board to recommend to the Director
appropriate rules and to screen applicants and recommend
licensing renewal, reinstatement and re-licensure actions.
Finally, § 58-1-9 states that a duty, function and responsibility
of the Division, in collaboration with the Board, is to prescribe
license qualifications and to prescribe rules governing
applications for licenses.

These three statutes, therefore,

allow the Division, in collaboration with the Board, to set a
standard for licensing qualification for all applicants applying
for professional licensure.

They also designate the Division, in

2

collaboration with the Board, to prescribe any rules governing
applications for licenses.
In unrefuted testimony, Dr. Thomas Schenkenberg described
the complicated process for the promulgation of Rules.

According

to Dr. Schenkenberg the process includes drafts by the Utah
Psychological Association and reviews by the Psychology Board.
Reviews are made available to every psychologist in the State.
The Board reviews national trends in licensing laws and reviews
are conducted of the Psychological Association Model Licensing
Act for compatibility and consistency with other states.
(Transcript p. 147-148).

Dr. Schenkenberg further testified that

the Utah statute does not provide discretionary language allowing
the Board to make a decision that is not based on the statute.
(Transcript 163-168).

It is an unrefuted that the regulatory

language in the Utah Statute was drawn form a national source and
that thirty three (33) jurisdictions use the same or more
restrictive language.

(Transcript p. 173.)

Candidates for licensure as psychologists in the State of
Utah are called upon to meet the requirements of Utah Code Ann.
§ 58-25-2 Section (l)(b) of this statute requires that
candidates;
produce transcripts of credit which are acceptable to
the representative committee which demonstrate that the
candidate for licensing has received a doctoral degree
based on a program of studies whose content was
3

primarily psychological, from an accredited educational
institution recognized by the Division.
(Empha sis added.)
The above stated section was analyzed by the Supreme Court of
Utah in 1981, in the* case of Athay v. State Dep't of Business
Regulation, 626 P.2d 965, (Utah 1981).

In Athay, the trial court

looked at the statute and rules and found that:
No rules, regulations, guidelines, or description of
any kind relating to the type of courses which would be
considered by the Committee to be "primarily
psychological" within the meaning of the statute had,
at that time, ever been adopted, published or
communicated by the Committee. . . .
Id. at 966 (Emphasis provided by the Court).
Because of this the Court felt that there were no objective,
identifiable standards against which the applicant's
qualifications could be judged.

The trial court felt that the

statute was vague and ambiguous in nature.

This deprived the

plaintiff of an opportunity to qualify and offended basic notions
of due process.

Id.

The Supreme Court in Athay affirmed the trial court's
finding and held that:
The legislative* grant of authority to the
administrative agency is necessarily in general
language. It is the responsibility of the
administrative body to formulate, publish and make
available to concerned persons rules which are
sufficiently definite and clear that persons of
ordinary intelligence will be understand and abide by
them.
4

Id. at 968 (Emphasis added.)
The Court further stated that the failure to establish guidelines
for a curriculum or a criteria for course content, which is
"primarily psychological" constituted arbitrary action.
Partially in response to the filing of the Atheiy case and in
holding with § 58-1-1 et seq., the Division, in collaboration
with the Psychology Board promulgated rules defining the
requirements for applicants.

One of these rules is the rule at

issue in this case, R153-25-8(4)(b).
R153-25-1 et seq.

The Rules are outlined in

Section 8(4)(b) which defines "a program of

studies whose content is primarily psychological" as follows:
(b) The program wherever it may be administratively
housed, must be clearly identified and labelled as a
psychology program. Such a program must specify in
pertinent institutional catalogs and brochures its
intent to educate and train professional psychologists.
The Petitioner in this matter, has not met the requirements
described in R153-25-8(4)b.

(See Order, Appendix A.)

Fussell,

received a Doctor of Education (Ed.D) degree through the Human
Development Counseling program of the George Peabody College for
teachers at Vanderbilt University (Peabody).

The 1976-77 course

catalog for this college reflects that Doctorate Degrees of
Education were available in three programs within the college:
Human Development Counseling, Psychology and Special Education.
Fussell chose Human Development Counseling, a program whichf
5

according to the Licensing Board and the Special Appeals Board,
does not qualify her for licensure in the State of Utah.

One of

the reasons for this decision is that the Human Development
Counseling Program is described in the Peabody College catalog as
follows:
The primary goal of the Human Development
Counseling Program is to train individuals at the M.S.,
Ed.S, and Ed.D levels to intervene via the helping
relationship as a means of enabling persons to become
more fully functioning... The Peabody program
recognizes the professionally trained counselor as a
human development teacher whose primary function is to
help individuals enhance life adjustment and facilitate
behavioral development, such that they can cope more
effectively with their environment. . . .
Settings in which graduates apply their counseling
skills will vary. They will include school counseling
and guidance, classroom teaching, correctional
institutions, vocational rehabilitation centers, mental
health centers, drug treatment centers, marriage and
family counseling clinics and community action
agencies.
(Empha sis added.)
The course catalog further provides as follows:
The curriculum of the program in human development
counseling conforms to the Standards for the
Preparation of Counselors and Other Personal Service
Specialists developed by the Association of Counselor
Educators and Supervisors (ACES), and is intended to
reflect the trend in professional training programs for
its competency/performance-based instruction.

6

The Psychology Program offered in the 1976-77 course catalog
for the George Peabody College for Teachers at Vanderbilt
University describes its course offerings as follows:
Programs in psychology reflect concern about the
development of human resources and the discovery of new
ways to bring psychological knowledge and research
skills to bear upon societal problems, especially those
which are amenable to intervention during the early
years of life. A heavy emphasis is placed on doctoral
level training in various specialty areas including
developmental psychology, educational psychology,
experimental psychology, mental retardation research,
social and personality psychology, and transactionalecological psychology (which includes sub specialties
of clinical, community, counseling and social
psychology), which are accredited by the American
Psychological Association. . . .
General requirements of all psychology students
are kept to a minimal level to encourage and their
advisors to develop carefully thought-out programs
designed to meet the specific needs of the individual
students, A training committee faculty and student
exist for each area of specialization which sets
specific guidelines and requirements for the
specialization.
The above stated description of the Psychology Program clearly
fits within the requirements set out by R153-25-8 (4)(b).
Fussell, however, took course in Human Development rather than
the Psychology Program.

Fussell received her degree in 1985.

The program catalog of the Peabody in 1985 makes it even clearer
that the Human Development Program is not a Psychology Program.
According to the catalog:
Credentialing as a nationally certified counselor
is possible through the department. In addition,
7

certification as a school counselor may be obtained
through appropriate course work. Students wishing to
be licensed in marriage and family counseling or other
related areas, may arrange through additional course
work and supervision to apply for licensure, depending
on state regulations. Individuals interested in
clinical psychology training or licensure as a
psychologist, however, should apply to programs
approved by the American Psychological Association.
(Empha sis added.)
The 1985 catalog in describing the Human Development Program
provides:
At the post-baccalaureate level the Department of
Human Development Counseling (HDC) has as its primary
goal the education of mental health generalists who
will function in a host of mental settings as
counselors. The program maintains a balance between
didactic and experiential learning. The HDC program is
interdisciplinary in nature with faculty and resources
from such areas as psychology, sociology, management,
education, human development and community
organization.
Although Fussell has testified that it was always her intent to
become a licensed psychologist, she did not enroll in a program
that was intended to train psychologists.

(Transcript p. 16, 19,

85. )
In applying for a license to practice as a psychologist in
the state of Utah, the applicant submits an application packet
which the Board reviews at their monthly meeting.

Two Board

members look at every file and if a question arises the whole
group discusses it.

In the instance of Fussell, her initial

materials were reviewed and several matters were clarified with
8

her by mail.

After these matters were cleared up, Fussell's

materials were reviewed and it was found that her program did not
meet the requirements of the Utah statue. (Transcript p. 165167) .
The Board, when considering applications for licensure
relies heavily on the statute and the rules and regulations as
guidelines by which to make their decisions.

According to Dr.

Schenkenberg, the Board's duty to the State and to the Governor
who appoints the Board is to apply the statutes, rules and
regulations as they're written and not to go beyond the authority
that's established within those guidelines. (Transcript p. 149.)
The Board may spend two or three hours reviewing an individual
applicant's file and discussing whether it meets the criteria
established by the rules and regulations.

Dr. Schenkenberg

testified that he was involved with the decision making process
on the application of Dr. Fussell.

He stated that there was a

series of votes and that the final conclusion of the Board was
that Fussell's program of study simply did not meet the statute
nor the rules and regulations.

According to Dr. Schenkenberg,

the Board felt that Fussell's program clearly did not meet the
requirements of § 4(b) of Rule 153-25-8. (Transcript p. 152.)
Dr. Schenkenberg further testified that "Human Development
Counseling is clearly not labelled as a psychology program."
9

There were six, and perhaps seven programs at Vanderbilt, at
George Peabody, at the time when all this educational experience
took place, which would have qualified.1
There is further unrefuted testimony that the movement of
the Board is toward raising the criteria set out in the rules.
(Transcript p. 160.)

Also, according to the testimonies of Dr.

Furhman and Dr. Schenkenberg, an exception has never been carved
out for any individual since the rules were established.
According to the doctors, there have been other incidents in
which an individual received his or her degree in a different
department, while a lot of their course work was psycholcgical in
nature.

As in the case at hand, these application have been

refused licensure.

(Transcript pp. 120-121, 159.)

The psychologists testifying on behalf of the State also
stated in unrefuted testimony that the program of studies taken
by Ms. Fussell was not in a department whose intent was to

1

"It is not simply a matter of laying off the Clinical
Psychology program against Human Development Counseling; there were
five or six other programs that would clearly qualify. [The rule]
states that 'A program must specify in pertinent institutional
catalogs and brochures its intent to educate and train professional
psychologist.' This clearly is not present in any of the [Human
Development counseling] catalogs or brochures . . . .
The
materials that Dr. Fussell presented to us indicate that the intent
of the program was to develop teachers. The program description
for 1985 states that; if the goal is to become a licensed
psychologist, go to one of the programs here at Vanderbilt that
have and APA accreditation-" (Transcript p. 152-153-)
10

prepare professional psychologists.

This was a matter of concern

to the Board because its members felt that It would affect her
ability to practice psychology as an independent, licensed
professional.

According to

-

^r

; it is impoutatit that a

student take an integrated program of studies that allows the
person to have both the experience and theory that are necessary
in order to practice psychology

(Transcript p. 82, 85.)

Dr.

Furhman testified that although Fussell has had many courses and
perhaps even many required courses, she has not matriculated and
has not been accepted i nto a pa rogram that was i ntei ided to train
professional psychologists.

This means that Fussell did not have

a directed and articulated integrated program of studies leading
to preparation as a professional psychologist.2

(Transcript p.

85. )

2

Although, the Petitioner claimed at the hearing her courses
were APA approved, it is undisputed that the APA does not accredit
courses.
Rather, according to Dr. Furhman's testimony, the APA
accredits programs. Dr. Furhman is a site visitor for the APA.
This position allows her to visit pre-doctoral training programs
and internship programs and either approve them for accreditation
or for establish accreditation. She assists in the review process
and submits recommendations to the national committee. Dr. Furhman
testified that the purpose of APA accreditation programs is to try
and insure continuing competency and a quality of educational
course work. Additionally, it assures that the program includes
both theory and provides a person with the kind of experiences that
allow them to practice independently as a psychologist as well as
insuring a high quality of training, both as a teacher and as a
researcher in psychological matters.
11

Dr. Malouf testified that Fussell's program was not
administratively housed in a psychology program, that the
brochures did not state the intent of training psychologists, and
that her program did not appear to be a psychology program.

Dr.

Malouf had a concern that the program outlined by Fussell seemed
extremely limited and was not intended to train a psychologist.
(Transcript p. 127-129).

Dr. Malouf further expressed concern

that since research is a major component what a psychologist's
work, a program that de-emphasizes research to that extent does
not qualify to train psychologists.

(See testimony of Fussell,

Transcript p. 180, where Fussell testifies that she did not wish
to do research.)

Dr. Malouf testified that Fussell's Human

Development program did not have the necessary focus or emphasis
on psychology.

Finally, he voiced a concern that there was no

process by which someone could be disqualified or taken out of
the program if they did not have a the proper skills or personal
traits to become a psychologist.3

3

In a normal psychology program, the student mast meet
certain qualifications and criteria to remain in the program. If
that student is failing or lacking in qualifications he would be
instructed to make up for it. If he could or did not, it would be
recommended that he leave the program.
The above stated criteria
and disciplinary approach did not appear in Fussell's program,
since she was training to be a Human Development Counselor rather
than a Psychologist. (Transcript p. 130-132.)
12

The Petitioner's program description was not "primarily
psychological" during t ho f.ntio ol her studies or at the time of
her graduation.

Fussell attended a university that offered

accredited programs in courses of study that are clearly
described as primarily psychological in nature.

Despite this,

she chose to take a course of studies that was designed to train
human development counselors rather than psychologists*

Fussell

could have enrolled in the psychology program and also have taken
courses with the practical approach she desired.
chose to develop her own program.

Instead she

(Transcript p. 180-18 3).

Finally, it must be noted that currently, Fussell is working on
the doctoral level as a psychologist at Weber State College.

Her

current employment is precisely what her program description and
her course of studies and training qualify Fussell to do.

It

should also be taken into consideration that Fussell has worked
in Utah since 1983.

The Rule at dispute in this case was

promulgated prior to 1983.

Therefore Fussell should have been

aware that her course work was not acceptable several years
before her graduation.

13

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT

I

FUSSELL PROPOUNDED AN INCOMPLETE STANDARD OF REVIEW
Two Utah cases, Grace Drilling v. Board of Review,, 776 P, 2d
63 (Utah App. 1989) and Pro-Benefit Staffing v. Board of Review,
775 P. 2d 439 (Utah App. 1989) set out the proper standard of
review in court of appeals review of agency decisions.

The

substantial evidence test propounded by the Grace Drilling courtrequires that the court review both sides of the record to
determine if the Board's findings are supported by the
substantial evidence.

This requires that the paarty opposing the

Board's decision has the burden of showing that the Board's
decision is not supported by relevant evidence that a reasonable
mind would find adequate to support a conclusion.

The Pro-

Benefit court stated that it would not disturb the Boards
application of factual findings to the law unless its
determination exceeds the bounds of reasonableness and
rationality.

The Court further states that the conclusions must

be reasonable and rational as measured against the language and
purpose of the governing legislation.

Despite Petitioner's

claims, the Board's decision is clearly based on Utah statute and
is neither unreasonable or irrational.

It was the Legislatures

intent that the Board interpret the relevant statutes.
14

The rule

in question interprets the relevant statue in a cl^ar, recisonable
and rationd1 manner,
POINT

II

FUSSELL IS NOT QUALIFIED TO PRACTICE AS AN
INDEPENDENT PROFESSIONALLY LICENSED PSYCHOLOGIST
IN THE STATE OF UTAH.
There is a difference between being qualified to practice
psychology on the doctoral level and being qualiiied to practice
independently as a licensed psychologist.

Fussell is currently

practicing psychology on the doctoral level at Weber State
College Student Counseling Center.

This is precisely what: her

course in Human Development Counseling trained her to do.

This

course of studies, however, did not train Fussell to work as an
independent licensed psychologist.

Fussell's program and course

of studies do not give her the expertise to become licensed in
Utah.
POINT

III

PRIOR TO RECEIVING HER DEGREE PETITIONER HAD REASON TO
KNOW SHE DID NOT QUALIFY FOR LICENSURE IN UTAH
Prior to receiving her degree, Petitioner had reason to know
that she did not qualify for licensure in Utah.

The rule at

issue in this case was promulgated prior to 1983.

Fussell came

to Utah in 1983, two years before her graduation.

Despite the

fact that she has stated that her intention from the beginning
was to be licensed as a psychologist and the fact that it is
15

clear from the relevant rule that her program did not qualify her
to be a psychologist, she did not change her course of studies*
Fussell's course of study does not qualify her for licensure in
Utah.

Any right Fussell may have to licensure is subordinate to

Utah's right to regulate the licensure of psychologists.

The

fact that Fussell did not choose to take a program of studies
that would be approved in the State of Utah, but instead chose to
take her own independent course, does not create a special
dispensation allowing her to ignore the statutorily created rules
and regulations.
POINT

IV

THE AGENCY'S ACTIONS ARE NEITHER ARBITRARY NOR CAPRICIOUS
Fussell provides no basis upon which to rest her claim that
the agency's action is arbitrary and capricious.

The Board and

the Division have promulgated rules which provide a clear and
acceptable standard by which students or applicants may judge
their qualifications for licensure.

Fussell claims that because

her course of studies does not meet these rules, the rules must
be arbitrary and capricious.

Fussell did not take a course of

study designed to train her to become a psychologist.

Fussell

designed her own course of study, taking courses in which she was
interested and apparently dismissing those in which she was not.
However, according to Ms. Fussell's logic, any student who took
16

numerous psychology courses could claim that he was therefore
qualified to become a ] i censed psychologist

.'uch a standard

would be arbitrary and capricious, were it to replace the clear
and acceptable standards which currently exist in the rules.
ARGUMENT
POINT

I

FUSSELL PROPOUNDED AN INCOMPLETE STANDARD OF REVIEW
Fussell relies heavily on Grace Drilling In expounding the
proper standard of review in this case.

Pro-Benefit Staffing

decided the same day, gives additional insight into the Court of
Appeals posture toward review of agency decisions.

Both cases

state that the standard of review for mixed questions of law and
fact is governed by the Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA)
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4). Grace Drilling primarily explains
what the "substantial evidence test" for UAPA is, while ProBenefit focuses on the standard of review in a state boards
application of law.
The substantial evidence test, as propounded by the Grace
Drilling court, requires that the court "review both sides of the
record to determine whether the boards findings are supported by
substantial evidence."

Grace Drilling, 776 P.2d at 68, n.7.

This means that the court must "consi clei: n o t oi i J y tl le evidence
supporting the Board's factual findings, but also the evidence
17

that 'fairly detracts from the weight of the [Board's] evidence'"
Id. at 68.
However, the
party challenging the board's findings of fact must marshal
all of the evidence supporting the findings and show that
despite the supporting facts, and in light of the
conflicting or contradictory evidence, the findings are not
supported by substantial evidence . . . . Substantial
evidence is "more than a mere 'scintilla' of evidence . . .
though 'something less than the weight of the evidence.'
Substantial evidence is 'such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion."
Id.

(Citations omitted.)
Thus, the party opposing the Board's decision has the burden

of showing that the Board's decision is not supported by
"relevant evidence [that] a reasonable mind [would find] adequate
to support a conclusion."

Id.

Fussell must show that a

reasonable thinking person would not agree with the board's
decision.

Fussell has not met this burden in her petition to the

Court of Appeals or her hearing before the Special Appeals Board.
In attempting to prove her claim that the Board's decision
is not supported by substantial evidence, Fussell points to the
decision in Athay

(Br. Petitioner p.24.)

Fussell also claims

that the State makes an arbitrary and undisclosed requirement, in
asking that a program be listed in the "Designated Doctoral
Programs in Psychology (DDPP)."
Utah law.

There is no such requirement in

Rather the DDPP is just one indication of the intent
18

and viability of a program of studies

Fusse] ] rial :os tl le claim

that this is a requirement in order to distract the court from
the more relevant issues.

One of these issues is that the Rule

in questioi i was promulgated in accordance wi tl 1 tl le Courts holding
in Athay.
At the time Athay applied for licensure as a psychologist in
Utah, the only existing standard was set under Utah Code Ann. §
58-25-2•

The Division had not promulgated any rules or standards

explaining what was meant by a program "primarily psycho]ogical
in nature•"

The lack of anything further in the statute, rules

or regulations explaining that phrase was the basis for the
courts decision.

The Athay court stated that "no objective,

identifiable standard existed against which the Plaintiff's
qualifications could be judged."

Athay 626 P.2d at 966.

After

Athay filed suit, but before her case was decided, 1he Division
promulgated the "objective identifiable" standards which Fussell
is now claiming are invalid or arbitrary and capricious when
applied to her.
In its explanation in Athay, the Utah Court of Appeals
recognized that a State agency necessarily has the authority to
promulgate rules and regulations explaining the agency's
authorizing statutes.

This authority was further recognized by

the court in Pro-Benefit.

The Pro-Benefit court stated that
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relief would be granted if an "agency has erroneously interpreted
or applied the law,"

Pro-Benefit 775 P<2d at 442-

The Court in

Pro-Benefit recognized that the current Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b16(4)b is identical to its Model State Administrative Procedures
Act (MSAPA) counterpart, §5-116 (c)(4) and then quoted f 3:01a the
comment section of the MSAPA:
Paragraph (c)(4) includes two distinct matters interpretation and application of the law . . . [WJith
regard to the agency's application of the law to specific
situations, the enabling statute normally confers some
discretion upon the agency. Accordingly, a court should
find reversible error in the agency's application of the law
only if the agency has improperly exercised it-'s discretion.
Id. at 442.
In the case at hand there has been no showing by the Petitioner
that the Division or the Board improperly exercised its
discretion.
The Pro-Benefit court goes on to say that it will
continue to embrace the analysis described in Administrative
Services for reviewing mixed questions of .law and fact
periodically . . . accordingly, under Utah Code Ann. § 6346b-16(4)(b) we will not disturb the boards application of
its factual findings to the law unless its determination
exceeds the bounds of reasonableness and rationality.
The Court in Pro-Benefit outlines the standard that must be
applied in an administrative hearing.

This standard requires

that the party opposing the Board's decision must prove that the
decision was unreasonable and irrational in order for the court
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to disturb an agency's application of law
such showmq m

t ho case at hand.

There has been no

Tho Psychology Board's and the

Special Appeal Board's decisions are firmly based upon the
relevant statutes, rules and regulations.
The Pro-Benefit < ourt additionally decided that the standard
of view is to be "a intermediate standard" covering "the Board's
conclusions, [which] must be reasonable and rational

h measured

against the language ind purpose of the governing legislation,'"
Pro-Benefit at 442.

The Pro-Benefit court explained that "[tjhis

intermediate standard of review also governs our review cf 'the
[Board's] interpretation of the operative provisions of the
statutory law it is empowered to administer, especially those
generalized terms that bespeak a legislative intent to delegate
their interpretation to the responsible agency'."

Id. at 442,

n.2
(Emphasis added.)
In the case at hand, the applicable statutes clearly
demonstrate that it is the Legislature's intent that the
Division, in conjunction with the Licensing Board, interpret the
applicable statutes.

Thus the Psychology Board, in promulgating

interpretive rules, has acted in accordance with the applicable
statutes.

lussell

however, would have the court believe that it

is beyond the Division and the Board's jurisdiction to make these
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interpretive rules.

Clearly this is contrary to the court's

finding in the Pro-ESenefit case.
In the Athay case the court felt that the statute was overly
ambiguous.

The rul€*s promulgated were intended to, and have

clarified that ambiguity.

Rule 4(b) is one subsection of a

section which sets forth an "identifiable standard. . .against
which. . • qualifications could be judged."

Athay at 966.

The

Division and the Board have acted within the legislcitive intent
in interpreting the statute through the rules.

The Psychology

Board and the Specicil Appeals Board have acted correctly in their
application of the rules and in finding that Fussell is not
qualified to become a psychologist in the State of Utah.

POINT II
FUSSELL IS NOT QUALIFIED TO PRACTICE
AS AN INDEPENDENT, PROFESSIONAL, LICENSED PSYCHOLOGIST
IN THE STATE OF UTAH
Fussell points out, in her brief, that she is qualified to
practice psychology on the doctoral level in the State of Utah.
However, Fussell does not distinguish between practicing
psychology on the doctoral level and being qualified to practice
independently as a licensed psychologist.

Currently,

Fussell is

practicing psychology on the doctoral level in the State.

She is

a staff psychologist, with the title of "Dr.," at the Weber State
22

College Student Counseling Center,

in point of fact, Fusseli is

doing exactly what the program she graduated from qualifies her
to do.

The Peabody college catalog description of Fusseli's

program states as follows:
The Peabody program recognizes the professionally
trained counselor as a human development teacher whose
primary function is to help individuals enhance life
adjustment and facilitate behavioral development, such
that they can cope more effectively with their
environment..,. Settings in which graduates apply their
counseling skills will vary. They will include school
counseling and guidance, classroom teaching,
correctional institutions, vocational and
rehabilitation centers, mental health centers, drug
treatment centers, marriage and family counseling
clinics, and community action agencies, (emphasis
added).
The catalog goes on to state that this program "stands in
contrast to the traditional approach to training."

Fussell's

program qualifies her to practice psychology at the doctorate
level, however, the program does not meet the Utah statutory
requirement for a license to practice psychology.

Nor does this

program demonstrate an intent to educate and train professional
psychologists as required.

Fussell's program was directed to

teaching situations rather than those of a professional
psychologist.
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The above description clearly intimates that Fussell **s
program stands in contrast to traditional psychological
training.4

The Peabody course catalog also describes the Human

Development Program as meeting "the Standards for the Preparation
of Counselors and Other Personal Service Specialist developed by
the Association of Counselor Educators and Supervisors (ACES)*"
Although, Fussell has worked as a psychologist at a doctoral
level, pursuant to U.C.A. § 58-25a~6, this does not qualify her
for licensure as a psychologist although in the State of Utah.
It simply qualifies her to continue in her current employment.
If Fussell wished to practice as a psychologist she should have
taken one of the numerous courses that train psychologists.

POINT

III

PRIOR TO RECEIVING HER DEGREE PETITIONER HAD REASON TO KNOW
SHE DID NOT QUALIFY FOR LICENSURE IN UTAH,
In 1983, Fussell was a psychology intern at the University
of Utah and has continued to work in Utah since that time.

Rule

153-25-8 which outlines and defines the statutory requirements,

4

The catalog description goes on to say that the traditional
approach
"generally focusses on maladjustment and abnormal
behavior, an approach which is increasingly regarded as outmoded,"
Nowhere does this description state that this "new approach" has
received recognition as being better than, or even the equivalent
of, a traditional psychology program for the purposes of licensure
as a psychologist
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was promulgated prior to 1983.

Because of this, Fussell had

reason to know that her program did not qualify her for a
psychologist license in the State of Utah.

Despite this, Fussell

continued in her chosen program of Human Development Counseling.
She continued with this program until she received her Doctor of
Education, in 1985.
The Petitioner has stated that her intention from the
beginning was to be licensed as a psychologist. (Transcript p.
16, 19, 41). Because she was living and training in Utah, after
Rule 153-25-8 was promulgated, she had reason to know, and should
have known that she did not meet the standards set by the rule.
Despite this, she continued in a program of studies and received
a degree that was not intended to train students to become
psychologists.

In the Peabody catalog the description of the

Psychology Program states that the Psychology Program places a
heavy emphasis on " doctoral level training in various specialty
areas...which are accredited by the American Psychological
Association."

From the descriptions of both the Human

Development and the Psychology Programs in the course catalog, it
is clear that Fussell had the opportunity to assess which
professional associations recognize and accredited the training
received from the programs.
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Although Dr. Fussell claims to be and is licensed in the
state of Tennessee, it is undisputed that the requirements for
licensing in Tennessee are lower than the requirements in Utah.
Tennessee accepts graduates from programs which are not termed
psychology programs, as long as the degree is from a "closely
allied field if it is the opinion of the board that the training
required therefore is substantially similar."
§63-11-208).

(Tennessee Code

The language in the Tennessee Statute allows the

Tennessee Licensing Board discretion in deciding which doctoral
degrees are acceptable for licensure in psychology.

Fussell

relied on the discretion of the Tennessee Board rather that her
program, in applying as an independent practicing psychologist in
that state.

In Utah, however, the Board does not have

discretionary judgement in accepting applications.

Utah statutes

do not allow the Board to go beyond the rules and regulations.
(Transcript p. 163).
"It is a commonly accepted fact that a states has the
authority to promulgate its own licensing requirements."

Brown

v. Bd. of Exam, of Psychologists, 378 S E. 2nd 718, 720 (Ga. App.
1989).

In the Brown case the appellant claimed that he had

called the Psychology Board secretary and ireceived incorrect
information as to the rules concerning licensure in that state.
A year and a half later, upon completion of his degree, his
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application was denied because he did not meet the criteria set
out in the Rules.

Brown sued the Board for negligence in not

providing him with timely and accurate responses to his questions
concerning licensure.
several ways.

The Brown case is relevant to this case in

First, the statutes in Brown closely resemble the

statutes in the State of Utah.5

Second, the facts of the case

address the issue of an applicants "right" to practice as a
psychologist.

The Brown case states as follows:

The [State], in the exercise of its police power to
protect public health and welfare, may regulate health
and related trades and professions...an individual does
not have a constitutional right to practice a health
care profession since such a right is subordinate tc
the states right to regulate such a profession.
Id, at 720 (Citations omitted.)
Neither Brown nor Fussell have the basic "right" to a license if
they do not meet statutory requirements.

The States right to

regulate the profession in order to protect the public and to set
a predictable standard for all applicants supersedes other
matters.

5

"Under OCGA section 43-39-5(b) the Board is expressly
authorized to "adopt such rules and regulations as it may deem
necessary for the performance of it's duties and [to] provide for
examinations and pass upon the qualifications of the applicants
for the practice of psychology. Under OCGA section 43-39-8(b)2,
one of the requirements of a candidate for a license is that he or
she "[h]as received a doctoral degree from a program in
psychology. . . from an accredited educational institution recognised
by the Board as maintaining satisfactory standards." Id.
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The Brown case further states that
"[T]he fact that Dr. Brown has worked as a psychologist for
the state does not give him a vested right to sit for the
licensing examination. Indeed, the state may require
additional requirements which would prohibit those already
licensed from continuing to practice in the regulated
field.••

Id. at 720.
Brown cites Hughes v. State Bd. of Med. Examiners 134 S.E.
42 (Ga. 1926) in stating that "an individual takes his license
subject to the states right . . . to make further restrictions
and requirements, which will be upheld if reasonable, even though
they prohibit some people from further engaging in a profession
under a previously granted license."

POINT

Jjd. at 721.

IV

THE AGENCY'S ACTIONS ARE NEITHER ARBITRARY
NOR CAPRICIOUS
Fussell relies on Pro-Benefit Staffing in claiming that the
agency has misapplied the law and that their actions are not
supported by the intermediate standard of reasonableness and
rationality.

In doing so, Fussell ignores certain portions of

Pro-Benefit.

As stated above, the intermediate standard of

review also governs the courts review of the Board's
interpretation of the statutory law, particularly those that
bespeak a legislative intent to delegate their interpretation to
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the responsible agency.

In the case at hand, it is clear that it

was the legislature's intent that the Division and the Board
interpret the statutes and promulgate the rules•

These rules

were written with the express intent of clarifying the
requirements for licensure as a psychologist in the state of
Utah,

These rules were promulgated for the purpose of providing

defined, clear, requirements for an applicant-

Dr. Fussell's

program of studies has not met those requirements.
Fussell goes on to say that it is arbitrary and capricious
to judge a doctoral candidates degree by three 03: four general
paragraphs in the introduction of a course catalog.

(Br. at 26).

It is clear, however, from the testimony of the State's witnesses
that their decision was not merely based on three or four general
paragraphs.

Rather, the Boards decision was based on a trine

consuming and complex process that involved review and input by
all members of the Board.

More than not meeting with one section

of a Utah rule, Fussell's program does not meet with the
standards set in Utah and 33 other states.
trained to be a Psychologist.

Fussell has not

Instead she set out on her own

course of studies that has trained her to be Human Development
Counselor.

Despite the claim that her course work was

supervised, her program was not directed toward psychology.

Any

input by supervisors would be directed toward Human Development
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Counseling,

Fussell has testified that she didn't bother to

research or take classes in which she had no interest.
(Transcript p. 180)

"Within the confines of the [Human

Development Counseling] program, and in conjunction with my
interests.

I designed the program with the assistance of my

advisors..."

Id.

Fussell further claims that she has produced acceptable
transcripts in this matter.

In doing so, Fussell ignores the

fact that the transcripts were never reviewed in depth by the
Board and that it is Fussell who claims the transcripts are
acceptable.

Drs. Malouf and Schenkenberg both testified ^chat

they had not considered or reviewed Fussell's record in order to
make a judgement. (Transcript p. 164). All three agency
witnesses expressed concerns about the fact that Ms. Fussell's
program did not focus on psychology.

As stated by Dr. Malouf,

"in order to be considered a psychologist, you have to graduate
from a program that is designed to train psychologist."
(Transcript p. 140). 6

6

According to Dr. Malouf, "my concern is that Dr. Fussell's
program does not account for the fact that this is a core body of
knowledge with set areas that are commonly accepted, and instead
chose a specific ar€>a or specific problem area to focus on, which
is much the same way as a marriage and family counselor or drag and
alcohol counselor. (Transcript p. 143)"
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In backing her claim that the Board's ruling was arbitrary
and capricious, Fussell cites Rule 153-25-8(4) (i) of the Rules.
According to Fussell, her qualifications meet with this section
of the Rule and should, thus, reach the other qualifications.
However, it must be noted, that in unrefuted testimony, the point
was made that the Board did not yet review this section of the
Rule.

The Board's denial of licensure was based on section (b)

of the rule.

Sections (c) through (i) were not closely reviewed.

(Transcript p. 165). Therefore, there is no basis other than
Fussell's opinion, upon which to claim she meets with the
requirements of section (i). Additionally, the rule is to be
reviewed as a whole and the applicant must meet all sections of
the rule, not simply one or two of them.
Finally, there is unrefuted testimony to the effect that
Fussell, does not meet other unreviewed sections of the rule.
According to Dr. Schenkenberg, Fussell does not qualify under
section 4 (e) which states, that "the program must be an
organized sequence of study planned by those responsible for the
training program, to provide an integrated, educational
experience appropriate to the professional practice of
psychology.

Nor does she qualify under section (g) which

requires that the program "must have an identifiable body of
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students who are matriculated in the program for a degree.
(Transcript p. 150-151). 7
Fussell has not demonstrated that the Agency's actions were
unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious.

Instead she appears to be

claiming that because she might qualify for one unreviewed
section all other qualifications should be ignored.

The Rules

provide clear and acceptable standard by which students or
applicants may judge their needs and qualifications.

Simply

because Fussell chosen to ignore that standard does not make the
rules arbitrary and capricious.
CONCLUSION
In accordance with the Utah statutes, the Psychologist
Licensing Board and the Division have promulgated rules which set
a standard which places applicants on clear notice of the
requirements for a psychologists license in the State of Utah.
Despite the fact that Fussell had notice and the ability to
select a program of studies that would qualify her to become a

7

Dr. Schenkenberg goes on to say that "there's no doubt that
the Human Development Counseling program had a matriculated,
identifiable body of students, but there was no body of students
revolving around the "program1* of study that Dr. Fussell developed
for her self.
Looking at this section rigorously and thoroughly and received
a tremendous amount of input from all those individuals who had
something to say on this matter. We concluded that the program of
studies simply did not match the rules and regulations."
(Transcript p. 154).
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psychologist, she chose a course of studies which did not*

The

rules meet the statutory requirements and reflect a studied and
careful basis for licensure.

These rules can not be ignored or

set aside simply because one applicant has decided to take a
program of studies and a series of courses that fit her
interests.

Rather than being arbitrary and capricious in denying

Fussell's license, the Division would be arbitrary and capricious
in granting her one.

The agencies decision to reject Fussell's

application should be upheld*
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^) 1

day of December, 1990.

lelfl-ssi M. HVibbell/
Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for the Division
of Occupational and
Professional Licensing
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this

->/ — day of December 1990, I

mailed via first class, postage pre-paid a true and accurate copy
of the foregoing to::
Jeffrey L. Silvestrini
C0HNEf RAPPAPORT & SEGAL
Attorney for Petitioner
Juanita J. Fussell
525 East First South, 5th Floor
P. 0. Box 11008
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008

34

BEFORE. THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL & PROFESSIONAL LICENSING
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION
OF JUANITA FUSSELL
FOR LICENSURE AS A PSYCHOLOGIST
IN THE STATE OF UTAH

ORDER

BY THE DIVISION:
Pursuant to Section 58-1-17(4)(b), Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended,
the attached Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommendation are
hereby adopted by the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing of
the State of Utah.

Dated this

cf^

day of May, 1990

/CL—

David E. Robinson, Director

Judicial review of this Order may be obtained by filing a petition
for review within thirty (30) days after the issuance of this Order. Any
petition for judicial review shall comply with the requirements set forth in
Section 63-46b-16.

BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL & PROFESSIONAL LICENSING
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION
OF JUANITA FUSSELL
FOR LICENSURE AS A PSYCHOLOGIST

:
:
:

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

IN THE STATE OF UTAH

:

AND RECOMMENDATION

Appearances:
Jeffrey L. Silvestrini for the Applicant
Melissa M. Hubbell for the Division of Occupational & Professional
Licensing
BY THE BOARD:
Pursuant to Section 58-1-17, Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended, a
hearing was conducted on April 10, 1990 in the above-entitled matter before J.
Steven Eklund, Administrative Law Judge for the Department of Commerce and a
Special Appeals Board consisting of Steven M. Ross, Maureen L. Cleary and
Bonnie Posselli.

Thereafter, evidence was offered and received.

The Board, being fully advised in the premises, now enters the
following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommendation:
FINDINGS OF FAC1
T.

On August 5, 1987, the applicant filed an application with the

Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing for licensure as a
psychologist in the State of Utah.

By letter, dated August 19, 1987, the

Psychology Examining Committee requested the applicant to provide further
information with regard to her doctoral program.
response to that request on August 26, 1987.

The applicant submitted a

2.

By letter, dated September 22, 1987, the Division notified the

applicant that her application was denied because her degree-granting program
did not qualify under Section 58-25-2 and Rule 4(b) of the rules pertaining to
the Psychologists Licensing Act.

By letter, dated November 16, 1987, the

Division notified the applicant that counsel had been sought from the Attorney
General's Office regarding the applicant's degree-granting program and that
the Board would reconsider the application after receiving such counsel.
By letter, dated January 26, 1988, the Division notified the applicant that
the application was denied on the basis of the above-referenced statute and
rule.
3.

By letter, dated January 6, 1989, the applicant informed the

Division that she had completed the examination process to be licensed as a
psychologist in Tenessee and became so licensed on December 13, 1988.

Based

on that licensure, the applicant requested that the Psychology Examining
Committee reassess her application for licensure in this state.
4.

By letter, dated January 31, 1989, the Division again denied the

application, stating as follows:
Utah's law was written to more clearly specify those
programs that are and are not considered psychology
programs. Although you have taken courses in the
psychology department, your degree is not in
psychology.
The only reasonable course of facts that we can
recommend is that you earn a doctorate in a psychology
program. Since this is what Utah (and most other
states) require, there is no alternative that will
suffice. The Utah law on this is quite clear. We are
sorry for any problems that this may have caused you.
5.

By letter, dated April 25, 1989, the applicant documented her

April 21, 1989 appeal from the denial of her application and requested that
David L. Buhler, Executive Director, Department of Commerce, convene a
Special Appeals Board.

By letter, dated May 2, 1989, Mr. Buhler advised the

-o-

applicant that such a board would be called to consider the denial of the
application for licensure.
6.

On September 27, 1989, an initial hearing was conducted before

a Special Appeals Board consisting of Elizabeth B. Stewart, David B. Erickson
and Becky Rock.

Certain evidence was offered and received by that Board.

Sparing detail, the Division moved to recuse one of those Board members, that
motion was granted and the remaining Board members were also recused from any
further participation.

As set forth above, the April 10, 1990 hearing was

conducted before Dr. Ross, Ms. Cleary and Ms. Posselli.
7.

On May 10, 1985, the applicant received a Doctor of Education

(Ed.D) degree through the Human Development Counseling program of the George
Peabody College for Teachers at Vanderbilt University.

The 1976-77 course

catalog for the just-stated College reflects that doctorate degrees of
education were available in three programs within the College: Human
Development Counseling, Psychology and Special Education.

The catalog

describes the Human Development Counseling program as follows:
The primary goal of the human development counseling
program is to train individuals at the M.S., Ed.S and
Ed.D levels to intervene via the helping relationship
as a means of enabling persons to become more fully
functioning. . . . The Peabody program recognizes
the professionally trained counselor as a human
development teacher whose primary function is to help
individuals enhance life adjustment and facilitate
behavioral development such that they can cope more
effectively with their environment
...
Settings in which graduates apply their counseling
skills will vary. They will include school counseling
and guidance, classroom teaching, correctional
institutions, vocational rehabilitation centers,
mental health centers, drug treatment centers,
marriage and family counseling clinics, and community
action agencies.

-<*-

The course catalog further provides as follows:
The curriculum of the program in human development
counseling conforms to the Standards for the
Preparation of Counselors and Other Personnel Service
Specialists developed by the Association of Counselor
Educators and Supervisors (ACES), and is intended to
reflect the trend in professional training programs
toward competency/performance-based instruction.
The central program units are six curriculum areas.
Each area has a prescribed list of courses which are
representative of the area. Students elect courses
based on individual needs and area rather than course
requi rements.

8.

The 1976-77 course catalog describes the Psychology program as

follows:
Programs in psychology reflect concern about the
development of human resources and the discovery of
new ways to bring psychological knowledge and research
skills to bear upon societal problems, especially
those which are amenable to intervention during the
early years of life. A heavy emphasis is placed on
doctoral level training in various specialty areas
including developmental psychology, educational
psychology, experimental psychology, mental
retardation research, social and personality
psychology, and transactional-ecological psychology
(which includes subspecialties of clinical, community,
counseling, and social psychology), which are
accredited by the American Psychological Association . . .
General requirements of all psychology students are
kept to a minimal level to encourage students and
their advisors to develop carefully thought-out
programs designed to meet the specific needs of the
individual students. A training committee of faculty
and students exists for each area of specialization
which sets specific guidelines and requirements for
the specialization.

9.

The 1985 course catalog describes the Human Developement

Program in the following terms:
At the post-baccalaureate level the Department of
Human Development Counseling (HDC) has as its primary
goal the education of mental health generalists who
will function in a host of mental health settings as

-D-

counselors. The program maintains a balance between
didactic and experiential learning. The HDC program
is interdisciplinary in nature with faculty and
resources from such areas as psychology, sociology,
management, education, human developement, and
community organization.
The catalog further provides as follows:
The department has recently been singled out as one
of 30 programs in the United States - out of nearly
500 - to receive program and accreditation through the
Counsel for Accreditation of Counseling And Related
Educational Programs (CACREP), established by the
American Association for Counseling And Development
(formerly American Personnel and Guidance Association).
The catalog also provides:
Credentialing as a nationally certified counselor is
possible through the department. In addition,
certification as a school counselor may be obtained
through appropriate course work. Students wishing to
be licensed in marriage and family counseling or other
related areas may arrange through additional course
work and supervision to apply for licensure, depending
on state regulations. Individuals interested in
clinical psychology training or licensure as a
psychologist, however, should apply to programs
approved by the American Psychological Association.

10.

The 1985 catalog describes the Psychology program as follows:
The Department of Psychology and Human Development
offers programs of study leading to the professional
degrees of M.Ed, and Ed.S in human development and the
M.Ed, and Ed.S. in psychology. The department also
offers course work toward the M.S. and Ph.D. degrees
administered by the Graduate School
...
Degree programs in the department emphasize basic
research as well as empirical, data-oriented approachs
to practical problems in education and human
development. The department is particularly concerned
about the development of human resources and the
discovery of new ways to bring psychological knowledge
and research skills to bear upon societal problems,
especially those amenable to intervention during the
early years of life. Areas of specialization include
the child development specialist program,

-b-

developmental psychology, educational psychology,
general psychology, mental retardation research,
social/personality and social development, and a
combined scientific/professional program in clinical,
counseling, and school psychology with a community
psychology component option.
Specific guidelines and requirments beyond general
departmental regulations are set by training
committees of faculty and students in each area of
speciali zation.

11.

A majority (58%) of the courses which the applicant completed

to attain her doctorate degree were taught by faculty in the Psychology
Department at Vanderbilt University and would have been generally available
to students working toward a psychology degree.

Approximately 80-90% of

courses taken by the applicant toward completion of her doctorate degree were
cross-listed to courses in the Psychology Department, although some of the
just-referenced courses would not have been taught by faculty in the
Psychology Department and would not have been generally available to students
seeking a psychology degree.

Three psychologists supervised the preparation

of the applicant's doctoral dissertion.
12.

Subsequent to obtaining her doctoral degree, the applicant

completed a psychology internship at the University of Utah and is presently
employed as a counseling psychologist at the Weber State College counselling
center.

The applicant is supervised by a licensed psychologist and the

nature of her existing employment is allowed, notwithstanding the fact that
she is not licensed in this state.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The applicant asserts that she has received a degree based on a
program of studies whose content was primarily psychological and contends
that she has thus satisfied the requirements which were previously set forth
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in Section 58-24-2(1)(b), quoted below.

The applicant contends that the

jjst-referenced statute, which was subsequently amended in 1989, did not
require a doctoral degree in psychology when the application now under review
was filed in 1987.

The applicant asserts that Rl53-25-8(4)(b), also quoted

below, is invalid if applied to mandate any such requirement.

Thus, the

applicant urges that her specific program of studies, while not culminating
in a doctoral degree in psychology, was such that the consideration of her
application for licensure should proceed in all remaining respects.
Section 58-25-2(1) previously provided as follows:
Each applicant for a license to practice as a
psychologist shal 1:

(b) produce transcripts of credit
which are acceptable to the
representative committee which
demonstrate that the candidate for
licensing has received a doctoral
degree based on a program of studies
whose content was primarily
psychological from an accredited
educational institution recognized by
the division
. . . .
With respect to the just-quoted statute, R153-25-8 provides:
4. " . . . a program of studies whose content is
primarily psychological . . ." means:
(b) the program wherever it may be
administratively housed, must be
clearly identified and labeled as a
psychology program. Such a program
must specify in pertinent institutional
catalogs and brochures its intent to
educate and train professional
psychologists.
In Athay v. Dept. of Business Regulation, Utah, 626 P.2d 965 (1981),
an applicant for licensure as a psychologist, whose application had been
denied on the basis that her curriculum had not been "primarily psychological"
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in content, challenged the predecessor statute to Section 58-25-2(1)(b) as
being unconstitutionally vague and ambiguous in the absence of any rules
relating to the type of courses which would satisfy the statutory
requirement.

The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's finding that

"the failure to establish guidelines for a curriculum or a criteria for
course content . . . constituted arbitrary action and deprived plaintiff of
her rights of due process of law".

Id. at 968.

Specifically, the Court

quoted the following language from the trial court's decision:
No rules, regulations, guidelines, or description of
any kind relating to the type of courses which would
be considered by the Committee to be "primarily
psychological" within the meaning of the statute had,
at that time, ever been adopted, published or
communicated by the Committee or any of the defendants
to the plaintiff, applicants in general, the public,
or the University of Utah, although it appears that
such definitions have been recently promulgated.
Thus, no objective, identifiable standard existed
against which the plaintiffs qualifications could be
judged by her or anyone else, including the
defendants." Id. at 966. (Emphasis in original.)
The Court further quoted from the trial court's decision, as follows:

The very circumstance that this Court is now being
asked by defendants to determine as a matter of fact
that plaintiff's curriculum was not primarily
psychological in content illustrates the vague and
ambiguous nature of the statute when applied in the
absence of uniform, published, identifiable and
objective standards. Plaintiff is here being deprived
of an opportunity to qualify for examination as a
licensed practitioner in her chosen occupation, and
thus to earn her living, on the basis of standards
which were not known and could not have been known by
her or by the University and the Department which
awarded her a Ph.D. in a field of specialization
designated as "Educational Psychology". This result
offends basic notions of due process. Id.

R153-25-8(4)(a) through (i) reflects the various factors to be
considered as to whether an applicant for licensure as a psychologist has
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completed "a program of studies whose content is primarily psychological".
Subsections (a) through (h) reference the nature of the program through which
the applicant has obtained their degree, whereas subsection (i) sets forth
the curriculum to be completed.

For purposes of this proceeding, the only

issue is whether the applicant has satisfied the provisions of Section
58-25-2(1)(b), with specific reference to Rl53-25-4(b).
The just-stated statute does not require that an applicant for
licensure as a psychologist have a psychology degree.
also mandates no such requirement.

The rule in question

However, the statutory language "based on

a program of studies whose content was primarily psychological" evidences a
legislative intent that both the nature of the degree-granting program and
the content of courses taken by an applicant be considered as to whether the
applicant has satisfied the provisions of Section 58-25-2(1)(b).

Further,

the criteria set-forth in R153-25-4 provides the appropriate guidelines by
which to assess the necessary compliance with the statute.
Concededly, the applicant has completed a significant number of
courses whose content was psychological.

Nevertheless, a considered review

of the 1976-77 and 1985 Peabody College course catalogs which were referenced
during the hearing clearly reflects that the Human Development Counseling
program was not primarily psychological in nature.

Notwithstanding the

affidavit of Dr. Julius Seeman to the effect that the Human Development
Counseling program emphasized the role of service providers and that a number
of students took their degree through that program to qualify for licensure
as psychologists, no reference is made to the study of psychology - whether
based on either a clinical or research emphasis - in the 1976-77 course
catalog which sets forth the description of the Human Development Counseling
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program.

Furthermore, the 1985 catalog reflects that the study of psychology

is only one of six areas combined to offer what is referred to as an
"interdisciplinary program".

Significantly, neither of those catalogs

reflect that the Human Development Counseling program was intended to train
and educate professional psychologists.

Thus, the applicant has not

completed a "program" of studies "whose content was primarily psychological",
as was required by Section 58-25-(l)(b) and as further defined in
R153-25-4(b).
RECOMMENDATION
WHEREFORE, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the application of Juanita Fussell
for licensure as a psychologist in the State of Utah be denied.

